Golden Dome:
Fantasy Strategy, Real Stakes
· By Dr Bleddyn E. Bowen, Durham University ·
U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposed “Golden Dome” missile defense system looks set to impact space far more than it will alter the nuclear balance on Earth. Details are still lacking, but indications are that the system may involve thousands of space-based interceptors (SBIs) deployed in low Earth orbit (LEO) to intercept Chinese and Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) before they reach the continental United States.
This idea is a rerun of former President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which was announced in March 1983 and pejoratively called “Star Wars” for its sci-fi level of technical unfeasibility. The fundamental physics, technologies and economics of nuclear weapons, long-range missiles and space weapons have not changed enough to provide the Trump administration with a way to cheat a “nuclear death”.1 The strategy behind Golden Dome as an effective and comprehensive nuclear missile shield remains a fantasy, but its impact on the future of space warfare and the military space industry are anything but imaginary.
It will always be cheaper for a state to build more nuclear weapons and decoys than a space-based defense system. Golden Dome, therefore, as a strategy to defend the United States against nuclear attack, is impractical, especially given the scale of the threat and alternate methods of delivering nuclear bombs.
To defend against North Korea alone, which may be able to amass enough fissile material for a few dozen bombs, thousands of space-based missile or laser interceptors would need to be placed in LEO just to ensure that a handful could be available to bring down a single missile at any time.2 A recent Congressional Budget Office projection tallies the cost of deploying an interceptor system at $160 billion-$550 billion, and that excludes any next-generation systems and replacements after 20 years.3 An even larger constellation of bulky, expensive SBIs is needed to meet the threat posed by the scale of Chinese and Russian nuclear arsenals.
The Threat From Above
SBIs, such as the “Brilliant Pebbles” system designed in the 1980s, are more effective as anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons than as interceptors of nuclear weapons. Golden Dome, as was the case with SDI, is emerging at a time of increased fears that satellites could be taken out, denying terrestrial military forces critical command and control infrastructure and intelligence. This is happening coincident with increased ASAT proliferation by the United States and its principal geopolitical rivals.
The United States, China and Russia have tested many ASAT technologies and techniques, ranging from close orbital/proximity inspections and maneuvers, grappling systems, interceptor missile tests, laser dazzling, and the jamming of satellite communications.4 India has also tested a “direct-ascent” ASAT missile interceptor by blowing up a target satellite in orbit in 2019, following China’s success in doing so in 2007 and the United States’ a year later. Russia conducted its own intercept test in 2021. Theoretically, 44 Ground Based Interceptors in Alaska could also be used to destroy satellites in LEO rather than space-based nuclear warheads.
But SBIs deployed in orbit for missile defense have more credible capabilities as space-based ASAT weapons. Satellites are, after all, relatively easy to interfere with or destroy; missiles and warheads are difficult to intercept. This is a critical consideration for the United States as Russia and China have expanded their military satellite infrastructure over the past 20 years, making orbit a more “target-rich” environment for American space weapons. Even the realization of only a fraction of the Golden Dome vision, with a hundred or so SBIs, would be a significant escalation in U.S. space warfare capabilities. It would be one, however, to which China and Russia may respond to.
Other important stakes are industrial and military-cultural. The initial tranche of Golden Dome’s funding is reportedly around $175 billion, a massive stimulus and transfer of wealth to the military-industrial complex, of which space industries are a crucial part. This portends a boom time for military space technology and service providers in the United States and its European and Asian allies.5 Their participation was a natural part of SDI as U.S. military power relied on ground stations and territory worldwide and niche industrial and technical know-how, it still does today.
The U.S. Space Force, established only in 2019, is still forging its identity as a semi-independent corps within the Department of the Air Force. It may wish to use Golden Dome and its space-based weaponry to entrench a more spectacle- and battle-laden warfighting-oriented space culture that emphasizes combat operations in space—even at the expense of crucial but mundane satellite services for terrestrial military forces that need those services to fight wars on Earth.6
There are, therefore, policy recommendations for Golden Dome. U.S. leadership should:
Develop and explain specific war scenarios for Golden Dome as basis for public discussion and education; this should include the interception or casualty rates that would constitute “success” for nuclear missile defense
Consider international perceptions of SBI deployments, even if intended for missile defense, as space-based ASAT weapons and the impact of such deployments on addressing, at the United Nations, threats to space systems, particularly with regard to responsible behavior in space
Ensure that the U.S. Space Force does not neglect its role in fielding crucial space services and support functions for the Pentagon as it seeks to develop a war-fighting cultural identity in orbit
Coordinate, with allies, approaches for participation and involvement in systems development for Golden Dome as a global space-based weapons system that requires global terrestrial support infrastructure using those allies’ territory
Communicate its intentions regarding any Golden Dome-related weapons-testing programs to allies and partners, including any intention to extend the Biden administration’s direct-ascent kinetic energy weapons test ban
1. On nuclear death, see: Hans J. Morgenthau, “Science, servant or master?”, New American Library, 1972 and Campbell Craig, “Glimmer of a New Leviathan: Total War in the Realism of Niebuhr, Morgenthau, and Waltz”, Columbia University Press, 2004.
2. Thomas G. Roberts, “Space-Based Missile Defense: How Much is Enough?”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 4, 2022. https://aerospace.csis.org/data/space-based-missile-defense-interceptors/
3. Phillip L. Swagel, “Re: Effects of Lower Launch Costs on Previous Estimates for Space-Based, Boost-Phase Missile Defense” (letter to U.S. senators), Congressional Budget Office, May 5, 2025.
4. Victoria Samson and Laetitia Cesari, “2025 Global Counterspace Capabilities Report”, Secure World Foundation, June 12, 2025. https://www.swfound.org/publications-and-reports/2025-global-counterspace-capabilities-report
5. On the industrial and allied participation in SDI, see: Aaron Bateman, “Weapons in Space: The Rise and Fall of the Strategic Defense Initiative”, MIT Press, 2024.
6. On the cultural challenges facing military space services, see: Bleddyn E. Bowen, “War in Space: Strategy, Spacepower, Geopolitics”, Edinburgh University Press, 2020.